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I. INTRODUCTION 
The right of the people to be free from unreasonable 
governmental searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment remains one of the most relevant, and intensely 
contested, protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In the post-
9/11 world, the difficulty of balancing governmental power with 
individual liberty has become more apparent than ever.1 It has 
become the Supreme Court’s duty to accommodate “these 
intensely clashing forces” by defining what constitutes an 
unreasonable search or seizure in a particular case, a decision that 
ultimately hinges on how the Court interprets the values inherent 
to the Fourth Amendment’s protections.2 However, if a state’s 
supreme court deems a Fourth Amendment interpretation to be 
too restrictive, it is the state’s prerogative to interpret its own 
constitution to provide greater individual protection than the 
Fourth Amendment.3 
In State v. McMurray,4 the Minnesota Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to make such a decision. However, by finding that 
there was “no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out 
for collection on the side of a public street,” the court held that the 
Minnesota Constitution does not provide greater protection than 
the Fourth Amendment in the context of warrantless searches of 
garbage.5 The majority’s decision ultimately means that police do 
not need a warrant, or even a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, 
 
 1.  For a detailed analysis of the liberty-security problem after 9/11 in 
relation to the Fourth Amendment, see Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: 
Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 312–32 (2009). 
See generally PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 5–8 (2005).  
 2.  Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. 
REV. 349, 354 (1974). 
 3.  Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (“Our holding, of course, 
does not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards on searches and 
seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”).  
 4.  860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015).  
 5.  Id. at 694–95.  
2
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to search through Minnesotans’ garbage left out publicly for 
pickup.6 
This case note first explores the history, development, and 
construction of constitutional search and seizure law in the United 
States.7 It will then discuss the facts of McMurray and examine the 
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions.8 Next, it analyzes 
the court’s decision, arguing that the court erred in accepting the 
reasoning of old precedent, which is laden with disturbing privacy 
and policy implications.9 Finally, this note concludes that the 
decision in State v. McMurray will lead to unconstitutional arrests 
and invasions of personal autonomy by the State, as it fails to live 
up to the level of protection guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment.10 
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW 
The tension between maintaining societal order and 
protecting individual liberty is so apparent in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because the amendment sets the limits for 
governmental intrusion into people’s private lives.11 However, as is 
the case in much of constitutional interpretation, drawing a clear 
line between acceptable and unacceptable government action is 
always easier said than done. The tension between competing 
values and the difficulty in drawing the line between them is, to a 
large extent, the reason why search and seizure law lacks a certain 
amount of clarity.12 At different times in its history, the Supreme 
Court has felt more pull towards either societal order or civil 
liberties. This tension is reflected in the evolution of Fourth 
Amendment case law.13 Thus, in order to fully understand where 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  See infra Part II.  
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth 
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the 
very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).  
 12.  See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 349–54 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is 
not clear. The work of giving concrete and contemporary meaning to that brief, 
vague, general, unilluminating text written nearly two centuries ago is inescapably 
judgmental. In the pans of judgment sit imponderable weights.”). 
 13.  See JOHN WESLEY HALL JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 48–49 (4th ed. 2012) 
3
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the Fourth Amendment stands now, one must first understand the 
historical context that has so forcefully shaped the path of this 
particular constitutional protection. 
This section will explain the origins of the Fourth Amendment 
and why the founders believed protecting against unreasonable 
searches and seizures was essential to guard against tyranny.14 It will 
then trace the development of search and seizure law in the United 
States, focusing on how the Supreme Court has expanded and 
constricted the Amendment’s scope under different contexts.15 
This section will discuss several alternatives for interpreting the 
Fourth Amendment.16 Finally, it will explore Minnesota’s place in 
all of this: how the Minnesota Supreme Court has treated 
warrantless searches of garbage in light of the Fourth 
Amendment.17 
A. Origins of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment’s place in the United States 
Constitution can be traced directly back to specific abuses by the 
British government in the years leading up to the Revolutionary 
War.18 In 1696, the British Parliament passed the Act of Frauds, 
which gave customs officers in the American colonies the power to 
“enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room, 
or other Place, and in Case of Resistance, to break open Doors, 
Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize, and from thence 
to bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize whatsoever, 
prohibited and uncustomed.”19 This extensive search and seizure 
 
(“The Supreme Court has said several times that the Fourth Amendment should 
be liberally construed to effect the basic rights it guarantees. It now is quite 
evident, however, that the opposite is true because the government all too often 
gets the benefit of the doubt rather than the citizen.”).  
 14.  See infra Part II.A.  
 15.  See infra Part II.B.  
 16.  See infra Part II.C.  
 17.  See infra Part II.D.  
 18.  JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A  
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment 
provides us with a rich historical background rooted in American, as well as 
English, experience; it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that 
grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary 
struggle with England.”).  
 19.  William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE 
L.J. 393, 404 (1995) (quoting Act of Frauds of 1662, 12 Car. 2 c.11 § 5(2)(Eng.)). 
4
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power was not exercised consistently until the 1750s, when war with 
France prompted England to begin enforcing customs laws even 
more strictly.20 Around this time, colonial courts began to issue 
writs of assistance, which granted customs officials the very broad 
power to search buildings for smuggled goods and compel others 
to help them do so.21 
One of the first demonstrations of the colonists’ unhappiness 
with British rule concerned these writs of assistance.22 Boston 
merchants challenged the writs in a case heard in front of the 
Superior Court of Boston in 1761.23 Representing the merchants, 
James Otis famously argued that the writs themselves violated the 
law because they embodied “the worst instrument of arbitrary 
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental 
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book.”24 Otis 
ultimately lost the casethe writs were upheldbut his arguments 
became famous across America.25 The principles at the core of 
Otis’s argument“privacy in the home coupled with a fear of 
unbridled official discretion”are reflected in search and seizure 
law today.26 
After declaring independence, Americans took steps to ensure 
that writs of assistance and other abusive search and seizure tactics 
would not become a component of their new society by including 
provisions in their state constitutions that prohibited unreasonable 
searches and seizures.27 The Fourth Amendment of the United 
 
 20.  Id. at 404–05.  
 21.  See id. at 405 (clarifying that the authority these writs confirmed was so 
broad because they permitted searches of any place based only on the suspicions 
of the customs officer, and they only expired with the death of the king who issued 
them). 
 22.  See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 18 
(2009) (“The colonist’s fear of continued abuse of writs of assistance was behind 
one of the first public demonstrations of the colonies’ unhappiness with the 
mother country.”).  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  James Otis, Address Before the Superior Court (Feb. 24, 1761), 
http://www.constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm.  
 25.  MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 19 (“Otis and Thatcher may have lost the day, 
but their arguments against writs of assistance reverberated across America and 
would shortly win the hearts of Americans.”).  
 26.  Stuntz, supra note 19, at 406–07. 
 27.  See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70–71 (“In the second half of the eighteenth century, a series of 
widely publicized abuses by King George III and his officials led the colonists in 
5
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States Constitution, ratified in 1791, became the national 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.28 The 
amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.29 
In light of the events leading up to ratification, and the fear of 
oppressive and arbitrary police power as articulated by James Otis, 
the language of the Fourth Amendment reflects the desire of the 
American people to preserve their own autonomy and power over 
their government.30 
B. Development of Search and Seizure Law in the United States 
One of the most important cases in early Fourth Amendment 
interpretation is an eighteenth century English common law case, 
Entick v. Carrington.31 John Entick was subjected to a warrant based 
on charges that he published criticisms of the Crown.32 The warrant 
did not specifically name the subject matter of the search, resulting 
in government messengers seizing all of his papers.33 Entick sued 
the messengers for trespass and won.34 Upholding the verdict, Lord 
Camden grounded his decision in property law, asserting that 
 
the New World to consider a right against unreasonable searches and seizures to 
be one of the important rights held against government. That right was articulated 
in several state constitutions . . . .”).  
 28.  See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 19–20 (explaining that the lack of a 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was one of the major 
concerns in ratifying the Federal Constitution). 
 29.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 30.  As Justice Jackson has noted, “[O]urs is a government of laws, not of 
men, and . . . we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
 31.  Entick v. Carrington [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807; see also LANDYNSKI, supra 
note 18, at 29–30 (explaining Entick’s considerable influence on the course of U.S. 
Fourth Amendment doctrine).  
 32.  See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect? Property,  
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 310–12 (1998) (summarizing 
Entick and explaining its role in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 33.  See id. at 311.  
 34.  See id. 
6
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property rights were sacred and could only be suppressed by laws 
passed for the public good: 
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that 
no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close 
without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he 
does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his 
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.35 
The Supreme Court relied heavily on Camden’s analysis in 
early search and seizure cases, as “[t]he teachings of that great case 
were cherished by our statesmen when the Constitution was 
adopted.”36 Boyd v. United States37 was the first U.S. case by which the 
Supreme Court began formulating the constitutional law of search 
and seizure.38 Using Camden’s analysis, the Supreme Court defined 
the protections secured by the Fourth Amendment in terms of 
property rights, distinguishing searching and seizing stolen or 
concealed goods from searching a man’s private books or papers to 
use as evidence against him.39 “It is not the breaking of his doors, 
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of 
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of 
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”40 This 
marked the beginning of a period characterized by a liberal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, where the Court, for the 
most part, adhered to its principle that “constitutional provisions 
for the security of person and property should be liberally 
construed” and refused to sanction any search of certain objects, so 
long as the owner had a protected property interest in them.41 
 
 35.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (quoting Entick, 95 Eng. 
Rep. at 817).  
 36.  United States v. Lefkowtiz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932), abrogated by Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).  
 37.  116 U.S. 616 (1886).  
 38.  LANDYNSKI, supra note 18, at 49.  
 39.  See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. See generally Morgan Cloud, The Fourth 
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional 
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576–79 (1996) (discussing Boyd as an example of early 
formalism by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).  
 40.  Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.  
 41.  Id. at 635; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It 
has been repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive a liberal 
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual 
depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or 
by well-intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.”), abrogated by 
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 308 (1967).  
7
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In the 1920s, however, the Court began narrowing the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment, due in part to the increased pressure to 
aid law enforcement in apprehending and convicting criminals 
during prohibition, while still conceptualizing search and seizure 
rights in terms of common law trespass.42 For example, in Hester v. 
United States, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not 
cover “open fields” around a person’s home.43 In Hester, the Court 
was asked to decide whether illegal moonshine bottles, discovered 
without a warrant on Hester’s land, were admissible evidence.44 
Relying on the common law distinction between a home and open 
fields, the Court held that the evidence was admissible by asserting 
that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to the area around a 
home.45 This literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s text 
significantly limited its scope.46 
Olmstead v. United States—another prohibition case—further 
narrowed the amendment’s scope when the Court held that 
wiretapping “did not amount to a search or seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”47 Olmstead had been 
convicted of “conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act.”48 
The critical evidence against him was gleaned from wiretapping his 
office phone line.49 Because the wiretapping did not involve a 
physical trespass or search of tangible effects, the Court again 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment literally.50 After Olmstead, 
Fourth Amendment protection involved a two-step inquiry to 
determine if a trespass had occurred: (1) did the government 
intrude on an area protected by the amendment; and (2) if so, did 
the intrusion involve a physical invasion that was constitutionally 
impermissible?51 In his now famous Olmstead dissent, Justice 
 
 42.  See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 263. 
 43.  265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
 44.  Id. at 57–59. 
 45.  Id. at 59. 
 46.  See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 27–28 (explaining Hester as the first 
narrowing of the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court as a part of the 
greater context of prohibition). 
 47.  277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
 48.  Id. at 455. 
 49.  See id. at 456–57. 
 50.  See id. at 465–66. 
 51.  See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION 85–86 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining how Olmstead’s literal 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment fundamentally differed from Boyd and 
8
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Brandeis sought to shift the Fourth Amendment’s focus from the 
property interest to the right to personal privacy: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect 
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions 
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the 
individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.52 
However, the Court’s “property-based literalism” dominated 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence until the Court faced another 
wire-tapping case nearly forty years later.53 
In 1967, the Court abandoned the property-based approach to 
search and seizure issues in Katz v. United States54 by declaring, 
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”55 Charles 
Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information in 
violation of a federal statute based on evidence of his conversation 
overheard by FBI agents who had placed a recording device on the 
outside of a telephone booth.56 Declining to decide whether the 
phone booth was a protected area under Olmstead, the Court 
instead shifted its focus to whether Katz sought to preserve the 
privacy of his conversation.57 Finding that Katz clearly had 
attempted to maintain his privacy, as demonstrated by entering the 
booth and closing the door, the Court reversed Katz’s conviction.58 
The legacy of Katz lies primarily in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence, where he proposed a two-part test to determine when 
a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.59 First, the individual 
 
limited the Amendment). 
 52.  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 53.  CLANCY, supra note 51, at 87–89 (“The property-based theories of Boyd 
and Olmstead succumbed within months of each other in 1967.”). 
 54.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 55.  Id. at 351–52.  
 56.  See id. at 348.  
 57.  See id. at 352.  
 58.  Id. at 358.  
 59.  See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also CLANCY, supra note 51, 
9
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must have an expectation of privacy for the area or items searched 
and, second, the expectation must be one that society recognizes as 
reasonable.60 Generally, what a person “knowingly exposes to the 
public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.61 This test—
and the accompanying privacy-centered focus—continues to be the 
standard for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment issues.62 
Fourth Amendment scholars generally agree that Katz was 
intended to expand the amendment’s scope by reframing the issue 
around individual privacy; however, there is also the sense that Katz 
has failed to live up to this expectation.63 “For what ultimately 
emerged was an Amendment that was privacy-bound, rising or 
falling in both scope and protection based upon how the notion of 
privacy fared in the Court and within society as a whole.”64 Under 
Harlan’s conceptualization, to successfully invoke the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, a person must not only have a personal 
expectation of privacy, but society must also be prepared to respect 
that expectation.65 Later courts, faced with technological advances 
that allowed less invasive intrusions by the police and increased 
pressure to fight crime, have been less inclined to find an 
 
at 92 (“It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz that endured.”). 
 60.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 61.  Id. at 351 (majority opinion).  
 62.  See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (“[P]roperty rights 
are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“[T]his Court uniformly has held that the application of 
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection 
can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that 
has been invaded by government action.”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 
(1974) (“[I]t is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.”); United 
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (“Any Fourth Amendment violation in the 
present setting must rest on a lawless governmental intrusion upon the privacy of 
‘persons’ rather than on interference with ‘property relationships or private 
papers.’”). 
 63.  See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385 (“[T]he effect of Katz is to 
expand rather than generally to reconstruct the boundaries of fourth amendment 
protection.”); John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court’s Conception 
of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 39 (1992) (“The majority in Katz 
appeared bent on establishing an expansive view of the Fourth Amendment. The 
Amendment was not to be exclusively tied to such property-bound notions as 
‘protected areas’ and ‘trespass.’”).  
 64.  Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (1994).  
 65.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
10
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individual’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable.66 Instances 
where someone knowingly exposed their words or activities to 
others, or to the public, have generally been outside the scope of 
the amendment’s protections.67 The reasoning being that those 
individuals essentially “assume the risk” of their conversations or 
activities being overheard or observed by anyone, including the 
police.68 
For example, in California v. Ciraolo,69 the Court held that 
police using a plane to see into a man’s fenced backyard, without a 
warrant, was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.70 
Chief Justice Burger admitted the area was within the curtilage of 
the home and that Ciraolo expected it to remain private—two 
fences shielded the entire yard.71 However, Chief Justice Burger 
justified his opinion by focusing on Katz’s holding that what a 
person exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not 
 
 66.  See Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the 
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 647, 665 (1988) (“The Katz promise had sowed its own seeds of destruction. It 
was no great surprise that a Court increasingly concerned with law and order 
would soon begin, under the Katz umbrella, to severely limit the ambit of fourth 
amendment privacy.”); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1346 
(2002) (“By failing to provide any real guidance or substance to the privacy value, 
the opinion did not shut the door to examining means, and subsequent decisions 
have taken advantage of this opening . . . .”). See generally MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 
230–33 (exploring the assumption-of-risk doctrine, separate from the Katz 
precedent, which suggests that when individuals undertake the risk that their 
information will be exposed to others, they have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy).  
 67.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (holding that a 
defendant’s expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers was not reasonable 
because people generally know that phone companies have access to, and often 
keep records of, dialed phone numbers); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 
442–43 (1976) (holding that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
bank records because they are a part of a transaction where information is 
voluntarily given to the bank employees); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
752–53 (1971) (holding that the evidence of a police informant who was 
electronically “bugged” was admissible because the defendant, by participating in 
crime, assumed the risk that one of his partners was an informant).  
 68.  See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal 
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the 
police.”).  
 69.  476 U.S. 207 (1986).  
 70.  See id. at 213–14.  
 71.  See id. at 213.  
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protected by the Fourth Amendment, ignoring the other 
component of Katz: what a person seeks to preserve as private, even 
in an area accessible to the public, might be constitutionally 
protected.72 
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court came to a similar 
conclusion when it was asked to decide the question of whether the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search of garbage left 
outside for collection.73 Billy Greenwood was convicted on felony 
narcotics charges based on evidence of controlled substances found 
during a search of his home.74 The police obtained the warrant to 
search Greenwood’s house by first searching his garbage left out on 
the curb, which provided enough evidence of narcotics use to get a 
warrant for the house.75 
Under Katz, the Fourth Amendment would only be violated if 
Greenwood had a subjective expectation of privacy for his garbage 
that was objectively reasonable.76 Building off previous decisions, 
like Ciraolo, which limited the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment if the defendant had exposed her activities to the 
public or to third parties, the Court found that no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists in garbage left out for pickup because 
anyone can go through the garbage once it is left out on the curb.77 
Greenwood set the precedent that a warrantless search of garbage 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.78 
C. Scholarly Alternatives for Interpreting the Fourth Amendment 
Fourth Amendment scholars are, for the most part, 
impressively united in their criticism of the Supreme Court’s search 
and seizure jurisprudence; the restrictions on individual privacy 
imposed by the third party doctrine, and the subsequently 
expanded police power, have been met with much frustration and 
disapproval, if the variety of scornful law review articles are any 
 
 72.  See id. at 214–15.  
 73.  486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).  
 74.  See id. at 37–38.  
 75.  See id.  
 76.  Id. at 39. 
 77.  See id. at 40 (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or 
at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, 
snoops, and other members of the public.”).  
 78.  Id. at 37.  
12
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/16
10 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] STATE V. MCMURRAY 365 
indication.79 However, those scholars also vary widely in their 
proposed alternatives for Fourth Amendment interpretation.80 For 
the sake of time and clarity, this section will explore only three of 
the many different proposed alternatives for Fourth Amendment 
interpretation that are out there.81 This process is intended to 
illuminate some of the problems inherent in the Supreme Court’s 
approach, but it will also expose the difficulty that accompanies 
devising a coherent and practical method for interpreting and 
applying a constitutional provision like the Fourth Amendment. 
This section will conclude with a discussion of the underlying 
interests and values that are inherent to the protections afforded 
under the Fourth Amendment.82 
1. The Political Fourth Amendment 
Professor Thomas Crocker argues that the two dominant 
narratives of Fourth Amendment interpretation—protecting 
privacy interests and regulating police conduct—overlook the 
 
 79.  See generally Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth 
Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1991) (“The fourth-amendment ‘reach’ 
cases are today in wild disarray and the subject of widespread attack.”); Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1991) (“Current search and seizure doctrine is 
inconsistent and incoherent. No one, including the police who are to abide by it, 
judges who apply it, or the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful 
sense of what the law is.”); Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1269 
(1991) (“[T]he Court has abdicated its responsibility to do more than apply fact to 
unquestioned law.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993) (“While questioning the merit of the 
Court’s current model, I hope to show that the Court has ignored or distorted the 
history of the Fourth Amendment.”); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A 
New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989) (“In the 
last decade . . . the Court’s means of promoting law enforcement interests has 
tipped the balance unnecessarily further and further away from individual 
freedom, significantly diminishing the realm of personal privacy.”).  
 80.  Compare BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT “POWERFUL ENGINE OF 
DESPOTISM” 104–06 (2007) (arguing for a return to the framers’ conception of the 
Fourth Amendment, which required warrants to search property and allowed for 
warrantless searches in public areas), with STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL 
THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177 (proposing 
an “adaptive originalism” approach). 
 81.  See infra Parts II.C.1–.3.  
 82.  See infra Part II.C.4. 
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political purpose of the Fourth Amendment.83 By only reading the 
Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, many aspects of a person’s 
everyday social life will not be protected by the Constitution 
because they have been exposed to the public, and the Court is 
unwilling to find an expectation of privacy in them.84 Combining 
these privacy considerations with rules that emphasize effective law 
enforcement practices results in a Fourth Amendment doctrine 
that “lurches from one consideration to the other, with no 
overarching guidance.”85 The solution, Professor Crocker argues, is 
to widen the scope of the Fourth Amendment so that it fits in with 
a broader reading of the Constitution.86 This wider frame allows us 
to see the connections between the First and Fourth Amendments 
and “provides a basis for reorienting the Fourth Amendment 
narrative around a broader political purpose aimed at protecting 
liberty.”87 Focusing on securing people’s rights to political liberty is 
essential in this modern era where social media allows us to share 
more and more personal information about ourselves, and we 
increasingly live and operate surrounded by other people.88 Under 
the narrowed Katz framework, the Supreme Court is finding fewer 
reasonable expectations of privacy to protect in a society where 
information is shared so easily.89 Crocker asserts that Katz was right 
to consider the social aspects of life but wrong to “focus solely on 
what social expectations thought about personal privacy as a way of 
regulating police practice.”90 The solution of using a broader 
scope—by viewing the Fourth Amendment as a part of the 
Constitution that protects individual’s political liberty—would 
 
 83.  Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
303, 306–08 (2010) (“We face a constitutional dilemma. Either we accept the 
existing limited, and increasingly irrelevant, Fourth Amendment protections for 
privacy, or we must seek to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment by seeing how it 
functions within a more comprehensive constitutional framework. This Article 
argues that the Fourth Amendment makes a distinctive contribution to a broader 
constitutional framework aimed at protecting political liberty.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 84.  See id. at 315.  
 85.  Id. at 340.  
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 341.  
 89.  See id.  
 90.  Id. at 372. 
14
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/16
10 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] STATE V. MCMURRAY 367 
protect the people in their everyday social practices, something 
necessary for the functioning of any democracy.91 
A potential problem with this conceptualization is that while 
reframing the scope of the Fourth Amendment to protect political 
liberty is a worthwhile objective, Professor Crocker’s proposal lacks 
a clear method for differentiating between cases. Similar to the 
manipulation of the Supreme Court’s privacy approach, courts 
could manipulate the political liberty rhetoric, absent a hard-line 
test applied to every case. 
2. The Fourth Amendment’s Right to Exclude 
Instead of broadening the Fourth Amendment’s scope to 
more adequately protect individual liberty, Professor Thomas 
Clancy proposes an analytical structure for the Fourth Amendment 
that is predicated on an individual’s right to be secure.92 Explaining 
that of the three options available for defining the scope of the 
Fourth Amendmentproperty, privacy, or securitythe first two 
have proven to be inadequate; the best alternative is to invigorate 
the concept of security and the right to exclude to properly 
conceptualize the values protected by the Fourth Amendment.93 
Professor Clancy explains that the privacy approach has largely 
been eviscerated; despite the Katz Court’s vision for the test to 
protect individual interests, later courts have “used privacy analysis 
not to expand protected individual interests, but to reduce the 
scope of the amendment’s protections.”94 The flaws of this 
 
 91.  See id. at 378–79.  
 92.  Clancy, supra note 32, at 307–08 (“This article explores the proper 
analytical structure by which to measure the meaning of the right to be ‘secure.’ 
Only by understanding the meaning of the term ‘secure’ is it possible to 
determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for individuals and, 
correlatively, the amount of unregulated governmental power the amendment 
allows.”).  
 93.  See id. at 308.  
 94.  Id. at 330–31 (“Reminiscent of the hierarchical approach of property law 
theory—where some types of property interests completely barred a search, or the 
absence of such an interest barred raising an objection to a search—the Court 
created a hierarchy of privacy interests. Expectations of privacy that ‘society is 
“prepared to recognize as legitimate”’ have, at least in theory, the greatest 
protection; diminished expectations of privacy are more easily invaded; and 
subjective expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as 
legitimate have no protection. The Court’s cases rejecting any legitimate 
expectation of privacy now comprise a long list of situations.”).  
15
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approach lie in that it has no textual support in the amendment, 
and that, because the concept of privacy is so fluid, it is left at the 
mercy of the shifting court majorities to decide what privacy means 
and protects.95 
Professor Clancy’s solution then is to refer back to the actual 
language of the Fourth Amendment and focus on the right of the 
people to be “secure.”96 He asserts that to the framers, this security 
was from unreasonable government intrusion, specifically granting 
individuals the right to exclude the government from interfering 
with one’s papers, houses, or effects.97 This right to exclude is 
critical; with it, people have the tool to protect themselves against 
non-justified government intrusions.98 Of course, with this view, 
people only have a right to be secure in what the amendment 
specifies: their person, houses, papers, or effects.99 Professor Clancy 
explains that this approach will bring considerable clarity to a 
murky search and seizure doctrine; if we refer back to the framer’s 
focus on security, we can allow individuals the ability to exclude the 
government from their person, houses, papers, and effects, thereby 
fulfilling the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and simplifying an 
important component of American society.100 
 
 95.  See id. at 339–40 (“Thus, while a liberal Court substituted privacy in lieu 
of property analysis to expand protected interests, a conservative Court has 
employed privacy analysis as a vehicle to restrict Fourth Amendment 
protections.”).  
 96.  Id. at 357–58 (“Privacy analysis purported to abandon reliance on the 
principle of constitutionally protected areas, with Katz asserting that the 
amendment protects people, not places. Such a claim simply ignores the language 
and structure of the amendment: People have the right to be secure only as to 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  See id. at 356 (“In other words, the Fourth Amendment gives the right to 
say no to the government’s attempts to search and seize. Privacy, human dignity, a 
dislike for the government, and other states of mind may be motivations for 
exercising the right to exclude, but they are not synonymous with that right or 
with aspects of the right. The right to exclude is the sum and essence of the right 
protected. Of course, the right is not absolute. It extends only to protect against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).  
 99.  Id. at 357.  
 100.  See id. at 368–69 (“This returns the structure of Fourth Amendment 
analysis to comport with the intent of the Framers: The people have the right to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. By affording citizens the ability to exclude, their security is assured. 
That right to be secure is clear and pristine—it is the right to exclude the 
government.”).  
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One issue this approach generates is that, although focusing 
on the Fourth Amendment’s actual languagea person’s right to 
be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effectsdoes 
provide a more clear methodology in defining what exactly 
individuals have the right to exclude the government from, in the 
twenty-first century, things like electronically stored information do 
not fit neatly within the Fourth Amendment’s eighteenth century 
language. 
3. Calling for a New Metaphor: Government-Citizen Trust 
Similarly—finding the Fourth Amendment’s focus on privacy 
wanting—Professor Scott Sundby argues for a new metaphor to 
conceptualize the search and seizure framework—one centered 
around the need to restore government-citizen trust rather than 
simply the “right to be let alone.”101 Professor Sundby explains that 
the “right to be let alone” no longer fulfills the values of the Fourth 
Amendment for several reasons, one of them being that in the 
modern world, the idea of being left alone seems outdated, at the 
very least.102 “Technological and communication advances mean 
that much of everyday life is now recorded by someone somewhere 
. . . . We may want to be left alone, but we realistically do not expect 
it to happen in any complete sense.”103 Professor Sundby does not 
have a problem with the concept of privacy being involved in 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, but asserts that it should be thought 
of as a “cherished principle” rather than how the Court currently 
uses it—as a quantifiable fact that helps decide whether there has 
been a Fourth Amendment intrusion.104 
 
 101.  Sundby, supra note 64, at 1754–55 (“This Article makes an initial effort to 
reframe the Fourth Amendment debate by exploring how the Court’s current 
metaphor for conceptualizing Fourth Amendment values, Justice Brandeis’s 
famous image of ‘the right to be let alone,’ no longer fully captures the values that 
are at stake . . . . Drawing upon the values underlying the Constitution and the Bill 
of Rights, I suggest that the animating principle which has been ignored in the 
current Fourth Amendment debate is the idea of reciprocal government-citizen 
trust.”).  
 102.  Id. at 1758–59 (“Perhaps most fundamentally, a Fourth Amendment 
based upon expectations of privacy must contend with the changing nature of 
modern society. The very notion of a right to be left alone seems a bit tattered 
once placed in the context of contemporary life.”).  
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 1760.  
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To rectify this problematic framework, Professor Sundby 
proposes reimagining the Fourth Amendment’s value in terms of 
trust between the government and its citizens.105 The logic is that 
the government draws its legitimacy from the trust of the citizens in 
electing representatives to govern for them, while the government 
must also trust the citizenry to act in accord with laws and societal 
standards.106 The “trust that the citizenry will exercise its liberties 
responsibly—that implicates the Fourth Amendment and is 
jeopardized when the government is allowed to intrude into the 
citizenry’s lives without a finding that the citizenry has forfeited 
society’s trust to exercise its freedoms responsibly.”107 Professor 
Sundby argues that this view will improve Fourth Amendment 
doctrine because it will transfer the focus from choosing between 
the governmental law enforcement needs and the individual’s 
privacy to the “larger context that finds mutual benefits from the 
Amendment for both the government and the citizen.”108 
Encouraging the use of a government-citizen trust metaphor 
might be a more enlightened way to think about the Fourth 
Amendment, but when faced with people who have committed 
crimes, or the possibility of preventing crime, it is difficult to 
imagine a court always having the inclination to step back and 
consider the philosophical nature of the relationship between a 
government and its citizens. 
4. Conceptualizing the Fourth: Is There a “Right” Approach? 
Analyzing three different alternatives for conceptualizing the 
Fourth Amendment law demonstrates the difficulty of approaching 
the people’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Three different legal scholars approach the issue three 
different ways, with all of them making astute arguments involving 
historical intent, legal and political theory, and social policy. What 
these proposed alternatives have in common is that they reflect 
their authors’ views on what the Fourth Amendment is really about, 
just as any other theory would. Legal principles and authority only 
get you so far when the subject of your analysis strikes as close to 
home as the Fourth Amendment does; when the government’s 
 
 105.  See id. at 1777.  
 106.  See id.  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  See id. at 1784–85.  
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ability to intrude into peoples’ lives is at stake, the conversation 
becomes more about what type of society we want to live in, and less 
about the one we actually live in. Professor Amsterdam said it best: 
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is 
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by 
the police is permitted to go unregulated by 
constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and 
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a 
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open 
society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking 
underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz, and it 
seems to me the judgment that the fourth amendment 
inexorably requires the Court to make. But it is a 
devastating question to put to a committee.109 
The right approach to conceptualizing the Fourth 
Amendment involves making a value judgment about what is 
necessary for our American idea of a free society. The underlying 
value of the Fourth Amendment must be characterized as one of 
individual autonomy rather than privacy. The language of the 
amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be secure in their 
person, houses, papers, or effects from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.110 This implies a level of independent protection where 
American citizens exist outside of the government’s authority or 
influence.111 The difference between autonomy and privacy may be 
considered by some to be “splitting hairs,” but using the concept of 
privacy is problematic, as it comes with connotations of shielding 
information and secrecy.112 Such connotations are not appropriate 
in the context of the Fourth Amendment; they imply placing blame 
on individuals for seeking to conceal information. Such 
connotations also too easily lead to the idea that the Fourth 
 
 109.  Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.  
 110.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 111.  See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“[The ideas 
presented in Entick v. Carrington] reach further than the concrete form of the case 
then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a 
man’s home and the privacies of life.”).  
 112.  See William Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1025–26 (1995) (“In other words, though privacy means many 
things and though Fourth and Fifth Amendment law protect many interests, one 
fairly well-defined and fairly narrow interest, the interest in secrecy, seems 
predominant.”).  
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Amendment should not extend to what people willingly expose to 
the public, or third parties; after all, if you want protection for it, 
you should have kept it “secret.”113 
A Fourth Amendment centered around safeguarding personal 
autonomy would impart a greater level of power and control for 
American citizens over the government: power to limit the 
government’s access to information about us and control over 
when and to whom we share the information, ideas, and projects 
that characterize our independent lives. The Fourth Amendment 
guarantees a right of the people because it is individual autonomy 
that is necessary for any free and democratic society to flourish. As 
Justice Robert Jackson noted, in his now famous and oft-quoted 
Brinegar v. United States dissent: 
These, I protest, are not mere second-class rights but 
belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among 
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a 
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and 
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and 
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in 
the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need 
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people 
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of 
these rights to know that the human personality 
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where 
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to 
unheralded search and seizure by the police.114 
It is the “dignity” and “self-reliance” of the people that is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment; so long as the Court uses 
such a narrow conceptualization of privacy as its basis for 
determining when a search is reasonable, it will continue to fall 
short of the amendment’s purpose.115 
 
 113.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hatever the societal expectations, they can attain 
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all 
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited 
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).  
 114.  Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949).  
 115.  See id.  
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D. Interpreting the Minnesota Constitution 
Although warrantless searches of garbage left out on the curb 
have been deemed acceptable under the U.S. Constitution, 
individual states can interpret their own constitutions to provide 
greater protections than the Federal Constitution.116 Historically, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has favored uniformity with the 
Federal Constitution and will not construe the Minnesota 
Constitution as providing more protection than the Federal 
Constitution, unless there is a “principled basis” to do so.117 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court exercises particular restraint when the 
text of the Minnesota Constitution and Federal Constitution are 
textually identical.118 
“Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution [is] 
textually identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.”119 The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Minnesota Constitution as awarding greater protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures in certain situations.120 
 
 116.  See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 2015).  
 117.  See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005) (“[W]e 
traditionally approach this task with restraint and some delicacy. Moreover, we will 
not, on some slight implication and vague conjecture, depart from federal 
precedent or the general principle that favors uniformity with the federal 
constitution. But, when we reach a clear and strong conviction that there is a 
principled basis for greater protection of the individual civil and political rights of 
our citizens under the Minnesota Constitution, we will not hesitate to interpret the 
constitution to independently safeguard those rights.”).  
 118.  See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999) (“A decision of the 
Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the U.S. Constitution that is identical 
to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of persuasive authority to this 
court.”).  
 119.  State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 209 (Minn. 2005).  
 120.  See State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181 (Minn. 2007) (holding police dog 
sniffing in hallway outside apartment requires reasonable articulate suspicion of 
criminal activity); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn. 
1994) (holding that the Supreme Court allowing roadblocks to investigate driving 
under the influence was a radical departure from the previous rule, and that 
police need a reasonable articulate suspicion of wrongdoing before making 
investigative stops in Minnesota); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781 
(Minn. 1993) (rejecting the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court 
concerning when a seizure occurs because the approach was a departure from 
precedent and the court saw no reason to follow the departure).  
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However, it has also consistently held that garbage set out for 
collection can be searched without a warrant.121 
III. CASE DESCRIPTION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
On January 25, 2012, a mandated reporter informed the 
Hutchinson Police Department about the possible use of 
controlled substances at David McMurray’s house in Hutchinson, 
Minnesota.122 McMurray’s daughter saw her mother with something 
that was believed to be a pipe used for drugs.123 
Upon finding that McMurray and his wife had previously been 
arrested for drug violations, Officer Erlandson contacted the 
commercial truck driver responsible for picking up McMurray’s 
garbage and requested that McMurray’s garbage be put aside for a 
police inspection.124 When searched, the officer found evidence of 
illegal narcotics in the garbage and used this evidence as probable 
cause to obtain a warrant to search McMurray’s house.125 Police 
executed the warrant and found 3.3 grams of methamphetamine.126 
The state charged McMurray with a third-degree controlled 
substance violation.127 McMurray moved the district court to 
suppress the evidence recovered from his home, contending that 
the warrantless search of his garbage was unconstitutional under 
Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution.128 The court 
denied the motion, finding that McMurray had no expectation of 
privacy for the garbage container he set out on the curb for 
pickup.129 At trial, the court found McMurray guilty as charged and 
sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison.130 
McMurray appealed, arguing that the district court committed 
reversible error by denying his motion to suppress the evidence 
 
 121.  See State v. Dreyer, 345 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1984); State v. Oquist, 
327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982).  
 122.  State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. 2015).  
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  Id.  
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recovered from his home, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed.131 Finding that the expectation of privacy in a person’s 
garbage is “eroded” when placed outside for pickup, the court of 
appeals adhered to the Supreme Court’s holding in California v. 
Greenwood, as well as its previous decisions, which hold the 
Minnesota Constitution does not provide people with a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their garbage left out for pickup.132 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide 
whether Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution offers 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution in the context of warrantless searches of 
garbage set out publicly for collection.133 
McMurray argued that the Minnesota Constitution provides 
citizens with an expectation of privacy in the contents of their 
garbage because historically, the state constitutional provision has 
protected broader expectations of privacy than the Fourth 
Amendment.134 McMurray also argued that the significant personal 
items that can be found in a person’s garbage indicate that 
Minnesotans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
contents of their garbage left out for collection.135 
The State countered that, because the Minnesota Supreme 
Court favors uniformity with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Federal Constitution, it should follow the Supreme Court’s 
decision in California v. Greenwood, where the Court held that there 
is no expectation of privacy in discarded garbage left for collection 
in an area accessible to the public.136 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is 
no principled basis to interpret Article 1, Section 10, of the 
Minnesota Constitution to afford greater protection against 
warrantless searches of garbage set out for collection than the 
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.137 
 
 131.  Id. at 689.  
 132.  State v. McMurray, No. A12-2266, 2013 WL 5021206, at *3 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 16, 2013).  
 133.  McMurray, 860 N.W.2d. at 689.  
 134.  Brief for Appellant at 6, McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (No. A12-2266). 
 135.  Id. at 8.  
 136.  Brief for Respondent at 4, McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (No. A12-2266) 
(citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988)).  
 137.  See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 694.  
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B. The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Dissent 
The majority first asserted that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
will not construe the Minnesota Constitution to afford greater 
rights than the U.S. Constitution, unless there is a “principled basis 
to do so.”138 When the text of the Minnesota Constitution is 
“materially identical” to the Federal Constitution, the court will 
only construe the state constitution to provide greater protection if 
one of three conditions exist.139 Because Article 1, Section 10, is 
materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, the majority went 
through those conditions to analyze whether there was a principled 
basis to find greater rights in the state constitution.140 
First, the majority found that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Greenwood was not a radical departure from its Fourth Amendment 
precedent.141 It was in line with the principles first articulated in 
Katz.142 The majority accepted Greenwood’s reasoning that because 
anyone can rummage through garbage on the curb, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in such garbage.143 
Second, the majority found that Greenwood did not retrench on 
the Bill of Rights issue of protection against warrantless searches 
because it was consistent with the decisions of most of the state 
courts.144 
Third, the majority found that the Greenwood holding did not 
fail to adequately protect basic rights or liberties of Minnesotans 
because Minnesota does not have a long tradition of protecting 
garbage set out for collection from a warrantless search.145 Instead, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that garbage set 
out for collection is not protected by the Fourth Amendment and 
may be searched without a warrant.146 
Writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Lillehaug asserted that 
Minnesotans do have an expectation of privacy when they put their 
 
 138.  Id. at 690 (citing State v. Harris, 560 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 (Minn. 1999)).  
 139.  Id. (citing Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005)).  
 140.  See id. at 691–93.  
 141.  See id.  
 142.  Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).  
 143.  Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).  
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. at 692.  
 146.  See id. (citing State v. Dreyer, 345 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1984); State v. 
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982)).  
24
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/16
10 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
2016] STATE V. MCMURRAY 377 
household waste in containers out on the curb for collection.147 
Justice Lillehaug argued that the Greenwood decision did not 
adequately protect the rights and liberties of citizens of 
Minnesota.148 Household waste contains an enormous amount of 
personal information that—thanks to the digital era—contains 
even more personal information than it used to.149 The dissent 
warned that allowing police to search these containers without a 
warrant, or even a reasonable articulable suspicion, gives the 
government a green light to broaden and deepen its efforts to 
acquire our most intimate information.150 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In his dissent, Justice Lillehaug asserted that of the three 
conditions allowing for the Minnesota Supreme Court to depart 
from U.S. Supreme Court precedent, this case implicates the 
thirdwhether the U.S. Supreme Court holding (here, in 
California v. Greenwood) adequately protects the rights and liberties 
of Minnesotans.151 This argument is persuasive but incomplete. This 
note will argue that the first condition is implicated here as 
wellwhether the U.S. Supreme Court made a sharp or radical 
departure from its precedent in deciding Greenwood.152 The fact that 
two out of three possible factors are raised by this issue, 
demonstrates an even stronger principled basis for the Minnesota 
Supreme Court to deviate from federal precedent, and by failing to 
do so, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed in its duty as “the first 
line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist 
system.”153 
This section argues that California v. Greenwood was a radical 
departure from precedent, warranting the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to deviate from the Supreme Court’s Greenwood holding.154 It 
will discuss McMurray’s implications for privacy in light of twenty-
first century technological and public policy changes.155 Finally, it 
 
 147.  See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 695 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 148.  See id. at 697.  
 149.  Id.  
 150.  Id. at 702.  
 151.  See id. at 697. 
 152.  See id. at 691 (majority opinion); see infra Part IV. A.  
 153.  State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985).  
 154.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 155.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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will propose that a better holding would have been to require a 
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing for police to search garbage.156 
A. The Greenwood Decision and Departing from Precedent 
The majority in State v. McMurray quickly accepted the 
reasoning of California v. Greenwood, foregoing an in-depth analysis 
of the previous search and seizure precedent.157 However, upon a 
closer analysis, Greenwood was a departure from precedent, 
indicating a principled basis for interpreting the Minnesota 
Constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment.158 The 
majority erred by dismissing this factor and deciding McMurray 
based on the reasoning of California v. Greenwood.159 
The majority asserted that Greenwood was in-line with the 
principles established by Katz: (1) that a person can invoke the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment if she has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area or items searched; and (2) what a 
person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection.160 The majority fell back on the reasoning 
that because all sorts of people and animals can rummage through 
garbage once it is set out on the curb, society does not reasonably 
expect the contents of garbage to remain private.161 The majority 
failed to further analyze the reasoning behind the Greenwood 
holding.162 
However, just as the U.S. Supreme Court has conveniently 
managed to do repeatedly, the majority in McMurray ignored the 
other essential principle established in Katz v. United States.163 It is 
true that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection, “[b]ut what he seeks to 
 
 156.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 157.  See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 691.  
 158.  Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that by 
the defendant exposing his garbage to the public, he relinquished his rights to 
Fourth Amendment protection), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967) (maintaining that what a person exposes to the public is not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, “[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).  
 159.  See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 697–98 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 160.  Id. at 691 (majority opinion).  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  See id. 
 163.  See id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.”164 Of course people expose their 
garbage to the public to conform with basic sanitation norms and 
ordinances, but most people also put their household waste in 
opaque bags, and then put those bags in containers with closed 
lids.165 These efforts demonstrate that people, knowing the vast 
amounts of personal information contained in garbage, actually do 
seek to preserve the privacy of their garbage.166 
The Supreme Court of Vermont came to this same conclusion 
in State v. Morris,167 where it refused to follow the Greenwood 
precedent and held that there is a privacy expectation in garbage 
left out for collection.168 The court reasoned that the possibility of 
animals or humans scavenging through garbage does not negate 
the expectation of privacy in such garbage “any more than the 
possibility of a burglary or break-ins negates an expectation of 
privacy in one’s home . . . .”169 The California, Hawaii, New Jersey, 
and Washington state supreme courts have also refused to accept 
Greenwood’s reasoning, finding warrantless searches of garbage 
unconstitutional.170 
In doing so, these courts have recognized what the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has refused to: that since Katz, the Supreme Court 
has applied an unnecessarily formalistic approach to 
privacywhich is neither in line with the spirit of Katz, nor with the 
spirit of the Fourth Amendmentwhere people forfeit their rights 
to be protected from government intrusion simply because they 
“choose” to expose themselves or their property to others.171 As our 
 
 164.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.  
 165.  See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 699 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Not only is 
household waste different than it was when Greenwood was decided, so are the bags 
and special containers into which the waste is placed for pickup or recycling. Like 
the City of Hutchinson, many municipalities now require closed, vermin-proof 
containers.”).  
 166.  See id. at 697.  
 167.  680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996). 
 168.  See id. at 93. 
 169.  Id. at 99. 
 170.  See People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Cal. 1971); State v. Tanaka, 
701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 803 (N.J. 1990); 
State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Wash. 1990). 
 171.  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court today . . . departs significantly from the standard developed in Katz 
for deciding when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred . . . .”); Schmerber 
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth 
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world grows smaller, with technology facilitating an unprecedented 
ease of communication, this third-party doctrine will prove to be 
increasingly irrelevant and unsustainable. Even in the smallest 
towns across America, people typically have no choice but to 
communicate and interact with third-party intermediaries, which 
then leaves aspects of their private lives unprotected by the Fourth 
Amendment.172 
California v. Greenwood’s departure from the principles 
embodied in Katz should have induced the court in State v. 
McMurray to deviate from Supreme Court precedent.173 Instead, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court accepted an unpersuasive decision that 
succumbed to the pressure of enhancing law enforcement 
capabilities over protecting the right of the people to live free from 
unreasonable government interference.174 
 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
intrusion by the State.”); see also State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 116 (Vt. 1996) 
(“[U]nconstrained government inspection of people’s trash is not consistent with 
a free and open society.”).  
 172.  See SCHULHOFER, supra note 80, at 130 (“Only a hermit can lay claim to 
complete secrecy. For anyone who wishes to inhabit the world, daily life inevitably 
involves personal associations and the information we exchange within them . . . . 
To insist that information is private only when it remains completely secret is 
preposterous.”).  
 173.  See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 2015). 
 174.  See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“In holding that the warrantless search of Greenwood’s trash was 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court paints a grim picture of our 
society. It depicts a society in which local authorities may command their citizens 
to dispose of their personal effects in the manner least protective of the ‘sanctity of 
[the] home and the privacies of life,’ and then monitor them arbitrarily and 
without judicial oversight . . . .” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Precisely because the need for action against the drug 
scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great. 
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when 
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocation-
camp cases . . . and the Red scare and McCarthy–era internal subversion cases . . . 
are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to 
be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to 
regret it.”).  
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B. McMurray’s Implications for Privacy and Policy 
1. Technological Implications for Privacy 
As Justice Lillehaug states in his McMurray dissent, since the 
Greenwood decision, the nature of household waste has changed: 
“this is not your grandfather’s garbage.”175 The State v. McMurray 
holding presents significant public policy concerns; one of them 
being the effects new technology will have for disposing of, and 
searching through, people’s garbage. This concern has two 
components: (1) there is increased probability of people disposing 
of technological devices that contain vast amounts of personal 
information, and (2) law enforcement has greater access to 
technology that allows increasingly thorough forensic analysis.176 
Although most people are encouraged by their local 
governments to dispose of electronic devices like TV’s and 
computers at specified recycling sites, small digital devices like 
flash-drives or computer disks often find themselves in the trash. 
Even if a privacy-aware homeowner takes care not to throw away 
any digital devices, electronic sensors and data-collectors are now 
present in a wide variety of consumer products that someone might 
not even be aware of the need to recycle or data-destroy.177 For 
example, sales of personal fitness monitoring devices, such as 
Fitbit™ and the Nike+FuelBand™, have exploded over the past two 
years and track personal information such as the number of steps 
its user has taken, the amount of calories its user has burned, and 
the distance its user has travelled.178 The average person is likely 
savvy enough to know not to throw away a computer, tablet, or 
smartphone, understanding the personal information contained 
on the hard drive, but in this new “internet of things,” many people 
might not realize how much information seemingly simple 
products can collect about their owners, or how to properly dispose 
of such products. Local governments typically post information on 
how to recycle electronics, but it is an individual’s responsibility to 
 
 175.  McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 697 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).  
 176.  See id. 
 177.  See generally Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps 
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 
87–92 (2014) (explaining the proliferation of data-collecting consumer devices 
and the implications for privacy).  
 178.  See id. at 101.  
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wipe data from such items.179 Moreover, not having fully caught up 
with the growth of data collecting products, community recycling 
guides generally do not inform community members of the need to 
wipe data from products such as fitness monitoring bands or bio-
tracking clothing.180 In deciding that Minnesotans have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court is opening the door for not only police 
but also third-parties to collect personal data from these types of 
products that unsuspecting Minnesotans might throw away. 
In addition to people owning, and consequently disposing of, 
a wider range of devices holding personal data, in the years since 
Greenwood, significant technological advances have been made in 
law enforcement’s ability to test and analyze biological waste. The 
people who are cognizant of the personal data contained on their 
various devices know not to throw any of them away without at least 
wiping their data. Those same people are still producing biological 
waste in the course of their everyday lives, which invariably ends up 
in the trash. If one thing has not changed since Greenwood, it is that 
“almost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste 
products.”181 And as Justice Lillehaug notes, “[i]nvestigative tools 
are much more sophisticated and their probing capacity now 
extends well beyond the curtilage. For example, law enforcement 
now has the ability to test—easily and economically—the DNA that 
can be gleaned from all manner of waste.”182 Although there are 
limitations imposed by Congress and state legislatures for collecting 
DNA and DNA databanking, “[i]n general, Congress has taken a 
supportive attitude toward DNA databanking and incentivized the 
development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases.”183 
Allowing police to examine people’s garbage without a warrant 
comes with the dangerous possibility that DNA may be collected 
 
 179.  See Data Privacy Information, RAMSEY CTY., https://ramseyatoz.co.ramsey 
.mn.us/Pages/ItemDetails.aspx?ItemID=159&ItemTitle=Data%20Privacy 
%20Information (last updated Aug. 30, 2013).  
 180.  See What Is Electronic Waste or E-Waste, RAMSEY CTY., https://ramseyatoz.co 
.ramsey.mn.us/Pages/Electronics.aspx?Category=Electronics&CategoryID=2 (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2016). 
 181.  Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798 (Alaska 1973) (holding warrantless 
searches of garbage constitutional).  
 182.  State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 698 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J., 
dissenting).  
 183.  EMILY C. BARBOUR, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL SHIFTS AND SELECTED TRENDS 80 (Lucille E. Huff ed., 2014).  
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and stored, constituting a truly astonishing level of governmental 
interference with the personal autonomy of private citizens that is 
altogether unheard of. 
2. Public Policy Implications 
Technological innovations since California v. Greenwood have 
increased the depth of information that can be found in, and 
extracted from, one’s garbage. However, societal changes have 
occurred in the United States as well; the year 2015 has witnessed 
re-invigorated conversations about issues such as racism, crime, and 
imprisonment in the United States—issues which, as it has become 
increasingly apparent, have yet to be resolved.184 It has become 
increasingly obvious, particularly as we have observed the long-term 
effects of the “war on drugs,” that some of our previous approaches 
to crime and law enforcement have not lived up to expectations. 
Consequently, there are serious policy implications to consider 
when accepting the reasoning of a case decided in 1988. 
The holding in Greenwood was published at the height of 
America’s war on drugs, when drug abuse was deemed “public 
enemy number one,” and prosecuting individuals involved in the 
drug trade was pursued at almost any cost.185 As a result, arresting 
drug users and dealers became the motive behind most of the 
warrantless searches of garbage executed by police across the 
United States and had a significant impact on American search and 
seizure jurisprudence.186 Lower courts in the eighties and nineties 
 
 184.  See generally Ben Collins, The War on Drugs Is Over (If You Want It), DAILY 
BEAST (May 8, 2015, 5:08 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/08 
/the-war-on-drugs-is-over-if-you-want-it.html; Lindsey Cook, No, Justice is Not 
Colorblind, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news 
/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/11/no-justice-is-not-colorblind; Steven W. Hawkins, 
The Conversation on U.S. Prisons We Should Be Having, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 
2015, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-w-hawkins /criminal-
injustice-the-co_b_7824086.html. 
 185.  See Claire Suddath, The War on Drugs, TIME (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html; see also 
Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the 
Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 712 (1993) (“When the civil 
rights of citizens suspected of drug dealing are involved, society has a strong 
tendency to abandon cherished liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights in its 
effort to win the ‘War on Drugs.’”).  
 186.  See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War 
on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1410 (1993) (“[T]he war on drugs has led to new 
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made frequent, and often scathing, references to the war on drugs, 
which the Supreme Court usually failed to reciprocate.187 As John 
Wesley Hall Jr. astutely noted, “the politics of the ‘war on drugs’ has 
stretched the Fourth Amendment to its limits.”188 This is more than 
slightly reminiscent of the early twentieth century holdings from 
Olmstead and Hester, where prohibition created a justification for 
enlarging the police power in the name of stamping out alcohol 
abuse, and the Fourth Amendment suffered its first blow.189 
However, it is now 2015, and public policy has largely shifted 
away from the war on drugs, with more people questioning its 
effectiveness than ever before.190 Numerous critics now frequently 
point to the United States’ overflowing prison population—the 
result of harsh and indefensible criminal penalties for drug 
offenses—as one of the most unfortunate and unintended 
consequences of the war on drugs, although the criticisms range 
much further than that.191 Allowing police to search through 
 
interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and the rules for search and seizure. 
Zealous law enforcement officials are inclined to stretch the limits of the 
Constitution in their desire to win the war they are fighting.”).  
 187.  Compare United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990) (“In 
this ‘anything goes’ war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our citizens’ 
homes seeking ‘consent’ to search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not 
America.”), with Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440–44 (1991) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a ‘war on drugs.’ No one 
disputes that it is the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons 
for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not 
proof of its constitutionality. . . . The majority suggests that this latest tactic in the 
drug war is perfectly compatible with the Constitution. I disagree.”).  
 188.  HALL, supra note 13, at 33–34. 
 189.  Sundby, supra note 64, at 1755 (“In 1928, at a time when the courts were 
facing a wave of Prohibition Act cases not unlike the current flood of cases 
resulting from the war on drugs, the Court confronted a situation where federal 
prohibition officers had placed wiretaps on the phones of a suspected bootlegging 
ring without any pretense of obtaining a warrant. Adhering to a very literal 
reading of the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Olmstead v. United States held that 
the Amendment’s protections did not apply because the placing of the wiretaps 
had not required the officers to physically trespass upon the defendants’ 
premises.”).  
 190.  See Maia Szalavitz, Viewpoint: How Marijuana Decision Could Signal Turning 
Point in the U.S. War on Drugs, TIME (Aug. 29, 2013), http://healthland.time.com 
/2013/08/29/viewpoint-how-marijuana-decision-could-signal-turning-point-in-the 
-u-s-war-on-drugs (tracing how the recent voter referendums in Colorado and 
Washington indicate a turning point in the war on drugs). 
 191.  See generally Mathew A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Norms and 
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garbage for evidence of drug use may have been deemed a 
reasonable display of police power in 1988, when the war on drugs 
was considered worthy of aggressive pursuit. However, after almost 
thirty years, it is clear the war is lost and we need to start looking 
back at some of the restrictions placed on the Fourth Amendment 
in the name of the doomed and destructive war on drugs. Is 
intruding upon an individual’s personal autonomy really worth it 
just to put another drug user in prison? With State v. McMurray, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit these 
policy considerations and steer Minnesota in the direction that the 
public is already headed; instead, the court fell in line with a dying 
policy that has failed to live up to the spirit of the Fourth 
Amendment and the values of this country. 
C. An Alternative: Requiring a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion 
Instead of broadly holding that Minnesotans have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb, the 
majority should have held that a warrantless search of garbage is 
unlawful without at least a reasonably articulable suspicion that the 
garbage contains evidence of a crime. The supreme courts of 
Alaska, Indiana, and Montana have adopted this standard, which 
recognizes that people have some expectation of privacy in their 
garbage that prevents random searches but allows police to search 
without probable cause.192 This standard finds a middle ground 
between protecting individual liberties, and allowing the police to 
effectively do their job.193 
 
Marijuana Prohibition, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 230 (2010) (arguing that 
prohibitions against marijuana use have not fulfilled their goals and it would be 
economically productive to fall in line with the social norm of marijuana use); 
Andrew D. Black, Note,“The War on People”: Reframing “The War on Drugs” by 
Addressing Racism within American Drug Policy Through Restorative Justice and 
Community Collaboration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2007); Ben Wallace-
Wells, How America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 24, 2011), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-america-lost-the-war-on-drugs     
-20110324.  
 192.  See Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 336 (Alaska 2009); Litchfield v. State, 824 
N.E.2d 356, 364 (Ind. 2005); State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d 800, 805 
(Mont. 2005).  
 193.  Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364 (“[A] requirement of articulable 
individualized suspicion . . . imposes the appropriate balance between the privacy 
interests of citizens and the needs of law enforcement.”). 
33
Hoglund: Constitutional Law: Hey, That's My Trash! Warrantless Searches of
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2016
10 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:57 PM 
386 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:353 
V. CONCLUSION 
In State v. McMurray, the Minnesota Supreme Court was asked 
to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of 
warrantless searches of garbage left out for collection.194 The court 
adhered to Supreme Court precedent and found that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb; 
therefore, there is no constitutional protection for it.195 The 
majority failed to fully analyze the extent to which California v. 
Greenwood was a radical departure from the values expressed in past 
precedent, missing a valid opportunity to deviate from case law that 
fails to protect, or even articulate, a clear and legitimate interest 
underlying the principles of the Fourth Amendment.196 Without 
even requiring a reasonably articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, 
McMurray potentially allows continued, significant government 
invasion on individual autonomy. 
 
 
 194.  State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. 2015). 
 195.  Id. at 694–95 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)). 
 196.  Id. at 693.  
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